UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs, All

Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

12-15-2017

State v. McKie Respondent's Brief Dckt. 45239

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
Recommended Citation
"State v. McKie Respondent's Brief Dckt. 45239" (2017). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs, All. 6908.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/6908

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs, All by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For
more information, please contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
) No. 45239
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
) Ada County Case No.
v.
) CR-MD-2015-12139
)
CHAD CHRISTOPHER MCKIE,
)
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
)
________________________
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
________________________
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF ADA
________________________
HONORABLE GERALD F. SCHROEDER
District Judge
________________________

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
Attorney General
State of Idaho
PAUL R. PANTHER
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Criminal Law Division

VERNON K. SMITH
Attorney at Law
1900 W. Main St.
Boise, Idaho 83702
(208) 345-1125

KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
P. O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
(208) 334-4534
ATTORNEYS FOR
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT

ATTORNEY FOR
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .............................................................................................. ii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE............................................................................................1
Nature Of The Case .................................................................................................1
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings ......................................1
ISSUE ..................................................................................................................................3
ARGUMENT .......................................................................................................................4
McKie Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court’s
Appellate Opinion ....................................................................................................4
A.

Introduction ..................................................................................................4

B.

Standard Of Review .....................................................................................4

C.

The Statute Does Not Exempt Mopeds From The
Definition Of Motor Vehicle .......................................................................4

CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................................9
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING............................................................................................9

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES

PAGE

Borely v. Smith, 149 Idaho 171, 233 P.3d 102 (2010) ....................................................... 4
Idaho Dept. of Health and Welfare v. Doe, 148 Idaho 124, 219 P.3d 448 (2009) ............. 4
Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758 (2008) ................................................ 4
McLean v. Maverik Country Stores, Inc., 142 Idaho 810, 135 P.3d 756 (2006) ............... 5
Robison v. Bateman-Hall, Inc., 139 Idaho 207, 76 P.3d 951 (2003) .................................. 4
State v. Barnes, 133 Idaho 378, 987 P.2d 290 (1999) .................................................... 4, 5
State v. Doe, 147 Idaho 326, 208 P.3d 730 (2009) ............................................................. 5
State v. Locke, 149 Idaho 641, 239 P.3d 34 (Ct. App. 2010) ............................................. 5
State v. Pina, 149 Idaho 140, 233 P.3d 71 (2010) .............................................................. 4
State v. Thompson, 140 Idaho 796, 102 P.3d 1115 (2004) ................................................ 4
State v. Trusdall, 155 Idaho 965, 318 P.3d 955 (Ct. App. 2014).................................... 6, 8
Verska v. St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center,
151 Idaho 889, 265 P.3d 502 (2011)....................................................................... 5
STATUTES
I.C. § 18-8004(1)(a) ............................................................................................................ 5
I.C. § 49-114(9)................................................................................................................... 1
I.C. § 49-123 .............................................................................................................. passim
I.C. § 49-401A(1) ............................................................................................................ 7, 8
I.C. § 49-426 ................................................................................................................... 7, 8

ii

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Chad C. McKie appeals from the district court’s appellate opinion affirming the
magistrate’s holding that it would instruct the jury that for purposes of DUI a motor vehicle
was a self-propelled vehicle.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
The state charged McKie with DUI, with an excessive BAC. (R., pp. 10, 58-59;
6/28/16 Audio, at 3:13-3:54.) McKie filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that he had been
driving a moped, which was “not a motor vehicle as defined” by Idaho statutes, and
therefore the court did “not have subject matter jurisdiction.” (R., pp. 18-19.) The
magistrate denied the motion on timeliness grounds, finding the issue was not
jurisdictional. (2/8/16 Audio, at 2:10-2:45; R., pp. 24, 231.) The court ruled, however,
that the issue of whether McKie was driving a motor vehicle would have to be addressed
at trial, and the judge ruled that the jury would be instructed that a motor vehicle is one that
is self-propelled. (2/8/16 Audio, at 2:45-4:30.)
McKie filed a “Motion to Reconsider Definition of Motor Vehicle within Jury
Instructions.” (R., pp. 26-41.) He also filed a “Requested Inclusion of Motor Vehicle
Definitions, and Exclusions, within Jury Instructions.” (R., pp. 43-54.) In these motions
he requested that the jury be instructed on the definitions of “motor vehicle” as contained
in I.C. § 49-123(2)(h) and “moped” as defined in I.C. § 49-114(9). (R., pp. 26-41.) No
ruling on these motions appears in the record. (See, generally R.)
McKie entered a conditional guilty plea to the charge, preserving the right to appeal
the court’s “ruling on February 8, that the vehicle in question here is a motor vehicle.”
1

(6/28/16 Audio, at 3:54-4:24; R., p. 56; Tr., p. 2, Ls. 3-8.) The magistrate entered
judgment, from which McKie appealed. (R., pp. 63-68.)
The district court affirmed the magistrate’s ruling. (R., pp. 233-35.) The district
court also rejected the argument that the statute is unconstitutional because it was not raised
to the trial court. (R., pp. 235-36.) McKie filed a notice of appeal timely from entry of the
district court’s appellate opinion. (R., pp. 238-42.)
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ISSUE
McKie states the issue on appeal as:
Whether the District Court erred when declaring a “moped” to be a
“motor vehicle” for purposes of the DUI laws, disregarding the amendments
made by the Idaho Legislature in 2008 to Title 49, Statutes of the State of
Idaho, exempting a “moped” from titling requirements, and excluding that
mode of movement from a “motor vehicle” under Idaho law.
(Appellant’s brief, p. 19.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has McKie failed to show error in the district court’s appellate opinion affirming
the magistrate’s decision to instruct the jury on the definition of the term “motor vehicle”?

3

ARGUMENT
McKie Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court’s Appellate Opinion
A.

Introduction
McKie pled guilty to driving a moped on a city street with a BAC of .253. (R., pp.

57-62.) On appeal he claims that the district court erred by affirming the magistrate’s
decision that a “motor vehicle” does not automatically exclude mopeds, and therefore
would be submitted to a properly instructed jury. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 19-47.) Review
shows no error. To the contrary, the plain language of the statute provides that selfpropelled vehicles are motor vehicles, with certain exceptions that do not include mopeds.

B.

Standard Of Review
On review of a decision rendered by a district court in its intermediate appellate

capacity, the reviewing court “directly review[s] the district court’s decision to determine
whether it correctly decided the issues presented to it on appeal.” Borely v. Smith, 149
Idaho 171, 176, 233 P.3d 102, 107 (2010) (citing Idaho Dept. of Health and Welfare v.
Doe, 148 Idaho 124, 126, 219 P.3d 448, 450 (2009)); see
also Losser
- --- - - -v.
- -Bradstreet,
- - - - - - 145
Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758 (2008).
The interpretation and construction of a statute present questions of law over which
the appellate court exercises free review. State v. Thompson, 140 Idaho 796, 798, 102 P.3d
1115, 1117 (2004); State v. Barnes, 133 Idaho 378, 380, 987 P.2d 290, 292 (1999).

C.

The Statute Does Not Exempt Mopeds From The Definition Of Motor Vehicle
The objective of statutory interpretation is to give effect to legislative intent. State

v. Pina, 149 Idaho 140, 144, 233 P.3d 71, 75 (2010); Robison v. Bateman-Hall, Inc., 139
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Idaho 207, 210, 76 P.3d 951, 954 (2003). Because “the best guide to legislative intent” is
the words of the statute, the interpretation of a statute must begin with the literal words of
the statute. State v. Doe, 147 Idaho 326, 328, 208 P.3d 730, 732 (2009). Where the
statutory language is unambiguous, a court does not construe it but simply follows the law
as written. McLean v. Maverik Country Stores, Inc., 142 Idaho 810, 813, 135 P.3d 756,
759 (2006); -see --also ---------State v. Locke, 149 Idaho 641, 642, 239 P.3d 34, 35 (Ct. App. 2010)
(where language of statute is plain and unambiguous, appellate court must give effect to
statute as written, without engaging in construction). Thus, if the plain language of a statute
is capable of only one reasonable interpretation, it is the Court’s duty to give the statute
that interpretation. Verska v. St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 151 Idaho 889, 89596, 265 P.3d 502, 508-09 (2011) (disavowing cases with language that Court might not
give effect to unambiguous language of statute if such was “palpably absurd”).
Idaho’s DUI statute applies to any person under the influence and “in actual
physical control of a motor vehicle within this state.” I.C. § 18-8004(1)(a). The Idaho
Supreme Court has indicated that the statutory definition of the term “motor vehicle” as set
forth in Title 49 applies to the DUI statutes. State v. Barnes, 133 Idaho 378, 381, 987 P.2d
290, 293 (1999). That title, in turn, provides the following definition of “motor vehicle”:
Every vehicle which is self-propelled, and for the purpose of titling and
registration meets federal motor vehicle safety standards as defined in
section 49-107, Idaho Code. Motor vehicle does not include vehicles
moved solely by human power, electric personal assistive mobility devices
and motorized wheelchairs or other such vehicles that are specifically
exempt from titling or registration requirements under title 49, Idaho Code.
I.C. § 49-123(2)(g). Under this plain language, a motor vehicle is broadly defined as one
that “is self-propelled.” Id. For the “purpose of titling and registration” a motor vehicle is
one that “meets federal motor vehicle safety standards as defined in section 49-107, Idaho
5

Code.” Id. Excluded from the definition are “[1] vehicles moved solely by human power,
[2] electric personal assistive mobility devices and [3] motorized wheelchairs or other such
vehicles that are specifically exempt from titling or registration requirements under title
49, Idaho Code.” Id.
“The plain language of I.C. § 49–123(2)(g) continues to define motor vehicles as
every vehicle which is self-propelled.” State v. Trusdall, 155 Idaho 965, 969, 318 P.3d
955, 959 (Ct. App. 2014). In Trusdall, the Idaho Court of Appeals rejected the argument
that because Trusdall’s UTV did not meet the federal motor vehicle safety standards, it was
not a “motor vehicle” for purposes of the DUI statute. Id. at 969-70, 318 P.3d at 959-60.
The Court of Appeals reasoned that to so read the statute would render language in the
statute superfluous, and thus contradict the directive that all words and provisions of the
statute are to be given effect. Id.
The same analysis applies here to McKie’s argument that lack of titling or
registration requirements exempts his moped from being considered a motor vehicle for
purposes of the DUI statute. Because the moped McKie was driving under the influence
was self-propelled (see R., p. 61), it fits the definition of motor vehicle unless excluded.
The first category of excluded vehicles is “vehicles moved solely by human power.” I.C.
§ 49-123(2)(g). The moped is not within this exclusion as it was propelled by an engine.
(R., p. 61.) The second category of vehicles excluded is “electric personal assistive
mobility devices.” I.C. § 49-123(2)(g). Again, the moped was not with in this exclusion
for several reasons, including that its motor was not electric. (R., p. 61.)
The third and final excluded category is “motorized wheelchairs or other such
vehicles that are specifically exempt from titling or registration requirements under title
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49, Idaho Code.” I.C. § 49-123(2)(g). Title 49, by operation of two statutes, excludes from
registration requirements “self-propelled wheelchairs, three-wheeled bicycles, wheelchair
conveyances, golf carts, lawn mowers, and scooters operated by persons who by reason of
physical disability are otherwise unable to move about as pedestrians.” I.C. § 49-401A(1)
(excluding vehicles exempted under section 426); I.C. § 49-426(2) (listing the exempted
vehicles and containing the quote set forth). These statutes, therefore, read together,
provide a broad list of “motorized wheelchairs or other such vehicles” exempted from the
definition of “motor vehicle.” The list is not so broad, however, as to include McKie’s
moped. (R., p. 61.) Because the moped is self-propelled and does not fit within any of the
exceptions, it is a motor vehicle.
McKie argues the phrase “or other such vehicles that are specifically exempt from
titling or registration requirements” excludes his moped from the definition of motor
vehicle because mopeds need not be titled. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 34-35.) This argument
fails grammatically because the list of exceptions, as argued above, is a list of three
conjunctive things (“[1] vehicles moved solely by human power, [2] electric personal
assistive mobility devices and [3] motorized wheelchairs or other such vehicles that are
specifically exempt from titling or registration requirements”), not a disjunctive list (“[1]
vehicles moved solely by human power, [2] electric personal assistive mobility devices and
motorized wheelchairs[,] or [3] other such vehicles that are specifically exempt from titling
or registration requirements” 1) as argued by McKie. The phrase starting “or other vehicles”

1

The state has here inserted the comma necessary for McKie’s interpretation of the statute
to be grammatically correct. The absence of the comma in the actual text of the statute
undercuts his argument, as he must rely on a grammatically incorrect reading of the
language.
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merely modifies the preceding phrase regarding “motorized wheelchairs,” and is not an
exclusion from the definition of motor vehicles in its own right.
Even if “other such vehicles that are specifically exempt from titling or registration
requirements” were a category unto itself, McKie’s argument still fails because it ignores
the language, “other such.” Indeed, if the legislature meant to exclude all vehicles that did
not require both titling and registration, it would have said just that and would not have
included the “vehicles moved solely by human power, electric personal assistive mobility
devices and motorized wheelchairs” language. The language listing the three specifically
exempted vehicles that require no titling or title or registration is thus rendered superfluous
by McKie’s reading. 2
Motor vehicle is generally defined as every vehicle which is self-propelled. I.C.
§ 49–123(2)(g). The plain language of the statute excludes from this definition only
“vehicles moved solely by human power, electric personal assistive mobility devices and
motorized wheelchairs or other such vehicles that are specifically exempt from titling or
registration requirements.” Id. A moped is not moved solely by human power; is not an
electric personal assistive mobility device; and is not a motorized wheelchair or other such
vehicle. The argument for excluding mopeds is basically the same as the one for excluding
utility type vehicles rejected in Trusdall, 155 Idaho at 969-70, 318 P.3d at 959-60. McKie
has therefore failed to show error by the district court when it affirmed that the jury would
decide if a moped was a motor vehicle under correct instruction.

2

The state further notes that if McKie’s reading of the statute were adopted it would not
be illegal to drive a myriad of cars or other vehicles while intoxicated, including, for
example: government vehicles, farm vehicles generally (including motorcycles,
motorbikes and utility type vehicles used in agriculture), many construction vehicles, street
sweepers, and forestry equipment. I.C. §§ 49-401A, 49-426.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court’s appellate
opinion affirming the magistrate’s ruling.
DATED this 15th day of December, 2017.

/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen___________
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
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